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In the first chapter, I examine an incomplete markets economy in
a politico-economic general equilibrium setting in which the median voter
chooses the inflation rate. I use an environment where individuals face an unin-
surable idiosyncratic labor productivity shock, and money is the only asset.
Being an effective tax on savings, inflation acts as a redistribution mechanism
transferring resources from the rich to the poor. I show that the median voter
chooses a positive inflation rate as the politico-economic equilibrium outcome.
In the second chapter, I analyze how forming a monetary union affects
consumption and earnings inequalities through monetary policy changes im-
plied by adopting a common currency. I use a two country open-economy,
overlapping-generations model with heterogenous individuals to investigate
these effects. In the model, inflation tax is the only redistributive tool and con-
sumption and earnings inequalities are decreasing functions of inflation. When
forming a monetary union, countries face a trade-off between the undesirable
vi
distributional effects of losing their monetary autonomy and benefits from the
elimination of trade frictions. Findings suggest that when countries choose to
do so, the country with higher initial inflation will definitely experience a fall
in its inflation, hence an increase in its inequalities. In the country with lower
initial inflation, however, inflation and inequalities might go in either direction
depending on the degree of heterogeneity and the trade dependency between
the countries. As the inflationary effect of uniting its monetary policy with
a high inflation country can dominate the reducing effect of vanished trade
frictions on inflation, this country might have an increase in its inflation, and
a decrease in its inequalities.
Finally, in the third chapter, I compare the indirect measure of inflation
expectations derived by Ireland (1996b) to the direct measures obtained from
expectations surveys in two case studies: the US and Turkey. Our results show
that the inflation bounds calculated for US data are more volatile than survey
results, and are too narrow to contain them due to low standard errors in con-
sumption growth series stemming from high persistence. For the Turkish case,
on the other hand, out of three different surveys on inflation expectations in
Turkey compared with the bounds computed using Turkish data, expectations
obtained by the Consumer Tendency Survey fall within these bounds through-
out the whole sample period. Moreover we show that, as Fisher’s theory
suggests, real interest rates are extremely volatile in Turkey and movements
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Chapter 1
Inflation in a Politico-Economic General
Equilibrium
1.1 Introduction
On the contrary to what Friedman’s (1969) optimum quantity of money
rule suggests, we have observed a positive inflation rate in almost every episode
of the US post WWII data. This study claims that this observation might be
observed as an outcome of a political equilibrium. Specifically, the question
studied in this paper is “Can we support the observed positive inflation rate by
a politico-economic general equilibrium?”. To answer this question, I employ
a model economy with production where individuals face uninsurable idiosyn-
cratic shocks to their productivity. Money is the only asset in the economy
and provides partial insurance. Particularly, individuals hold money to smooth
their consumption. Seignorage revenue is transferred back to households in a
lump-sum fashion. These assumptions give rise to a monetary equilibrium
where a positive inflation rate is desirable for the poorer households. Infla-
tion is costly on the other hand, being an effective tax on savings, it distorts
savings decision. I endogenize the inflation rate in a one-time-voting politi-
cal equilibrium where individuals choose their most preferred inflation rate by
computing its consequences and the median of these votes is obeyed by the
1
government operating in full commitment. I found that, mainly due to posi-
tively skewed US earnings and wealth distribution, the median voter chooses
a positive inflation rate in political equilibrium even though the social planner
chooses a negative inflation rate.
There are welfare and distributional effects of inflation on economies.
Most of the studies in the literature regarding inflation have only considered
welfare effects. Optimality of the Friedman rule has been the center of almost
all studies in this area 1. Relationship between inflation and inequality, on the
other hand, have not been studied until more recently and limited in number.
This paper analyzes effects of inequality on inflation2. Among the few studies
in the literature analyzing this direction, Bhattacharya et al. (2001)3 examine
how political factors affect the equilibrium determination of inflation in an
overlapping generations framework. They find a non-monotonic relationship
between income inequality and inflation. Bullard and Waller (2004) compare
three central bank setups in terms of welfare consequences and find substantial
inflationary bias when central banks are designed to apply majority voting
rule. Albanesi (2007), on the other hand, studies distributional effects on
inflation in a political economy framework other than the majority voting
rule. Particularly, Albanesi (2007) has an economy with two types of agents,
1Among others, see Kimbrough (1986), Ireland (1996a), Chari et al. (1996) and Correia
and Teles (1996).
2For studies on the other direction of the causality, i.e. distributional effects of inflation,
see, for example, Erosa and Ventura (2002), Doepke and Schneider (2006a) and Doepke and
Schneider (2006b).
3Later distributed as Bhattacharya et al. (2005a).
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the rich and the poor, playing a Nash bargaining game where the rich has a
higher bargaining power. It is shown that the model can support the positive
correlation between inflation and inequality in cross-sectional country data.
In that economy, the poor suffers more from inflation because they hold more
liquid assets as a fraction of their total wealth consistent with the data facts
mentioned in Erosa and Ventura (2002) (see also Attanasio et al. (2002),
Easterly and Fischer (2001) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000)). Erosa
and Ventura report that in the US low income households use cash for a
greater fraction of their total purchases relative to high income households.
These data facts are captured in my model too, i.e. the poor has a higher
cash holdings to total wealth ratio (since consumption is smoothed, wealthy
individuals have a lower consumption to savings ratio and, in turn, a lower
cash balances to wealth ratio). However, unlike in Albanesi (2007), the rich
suffers more from inflation because seignorage transfers are lower than the
consumption tax incurred to them. One important aspect of my model is
earnings mobility4 where individuals are not stuck to their types and they can
be rich (poor) sometime in the future even though they are poor today (rich).
This dynamic feature lacks in previous related literature, and is the center to
their analyses.
Doepke and Schneider (2006a) document large distributional effects as
a consequence of the high inflation episode in the seventies in US. In an over-
lapping generations framework where rich and old agents are the main losers
4See, for example, Dı́az-Giménez et al. (1997) for why mobility exists in real life.
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from inflation, they argue that welfare was improved by the help of transfers
financed by seignorage revenue. Borrowing constrained individuals benefit the
most from these transfers. In another study, Doepke and Schneider (2006b)
show that even moderate levels of inflation lead to substantial wealth redistri-
bution. Similar to these studies, inflation acts as a redistribution mechanism
from the rich to the poor in my model.
Political process in a country has been modeled in several ways in the
context of economics. The most widely used political scheme is the one where
the median voter deciding on the policy rule that the government applies5.
The median voter hypothesis assumes that every individual in the economy
votes and political influence does not differ within population6. The deter-
mination of the economic policy by median voter was used in the literature
first by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and a dynamic version was introduced by
Krusell and Ŕıos-Rull (1999). After these two seminal papers, several papers
studied taxation in the political economy framework (see, for example, Krusell
et al. (1997), Azzimonti et al. (2006) and Corbae et al. (2009)). The main
feature of these studies is that the median voter is poorer than the voter with
mean capital holdings and therefore votes for a higher level of proportional tax
than what the mean agent would vote. The same principal holds in my paper.
Particularly, labor productivity is introduced to the model used in the seminal
5For a discussion about the median voter hypothesis see, for example, Schwabish et al.
(2003).
6The full rationality of individuals (both as a consumer and a voter) is, of course, another
underlying assumption.
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paper by Imrohoroglu (1992) and inflation is endogenized in a political econ-
omy framework. Due to positively skewed earnings and wealth distributions
of US, the median voter chooses an inflation rate that is higher than welfare
maximizing level of inflation in my model economy. When computing the con-
sequences of their preferred inflation rate, individuals face a tradeoff between
advantages and disadvantages of a positive inflation. As a disadvantage, in-
flation distorts savings decision and reduces risk sharing. That is, individuals
economize on their cash balances at a higher inflation rate and since the risk
averse agents insure themselves through money higher inflation reduces overall
welfare. Since there is earnings mobility, overall welfare is embedded in indi-
viduals’ future value. On the other hand, a higher inflation rate means higher
transfers, and transfers are higher than the inflation tax on individuals with
lower wealth. The latter effect dominates the former to some extent for the pa-
rameters calibrated for US economy and therefore, the median voter outcome
can support the positive inflation rate observed in the real world. Results in
this paper show that the median voter chooses 1.1% inflation rate for the US
economy while the Friedman rule is optimal in the planner solution.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Next section introduces the model
I use in this study. Section 1.3 explains the parametrization while Section 1.4
presents the results. Sensitivity analysis of the results are reported in section
1.5. Finally, section 1.6 concludes the paper.
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1.2 The Model
In this section, I introduce the theoretical model used in the paper.
I use a model similar to the one used in Imrohoroglu (1992). She models
an economy with idiosyncratic employment shocks and individuals hold cash
balances to smooth their consumption stream. I introduce labor productivity
to her model. Particularly, individuals face the productivity shock instead of
an employment shock.
1.2.1 The Environment
The model economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived ex-
ante identical households of measure one. There is no aggregate shock but
individuals face an uninsurable idiosyncratic labor productivity shock realized
in the beginning of each period. The timing of the events in a given period
is as follows. Each period, individuals wake up with their nominal cash bal-
ances Mt and observe their productivity shock εt. Then, they give their labor
supply decision nt and receive labor income εtnt (the wage rate is normalized
to 1). The government decides on the money supply M st+1 and the lump-sum
taxes/transfers τt are made. Individuals decide how much to consume ct and
how much to save Mt+1. Individuals are not allowed to print money and this
is reflected in the nonnegativity constraint on Mt+1 below.
The exogenous productivity shock εt is independent and identically
distributed across agents and follow an S-state first order Markov process
over time with the support εt ∈ {ε1, ε2, ..., εS} and the stationary transition
6
probability matrix Π(εt+1|εt). Let Pt and mt = Mt/Pt be the dollar price of
the good and the real money holdings, respectively. An agent with asset level









subject to the following budget constraint:
ct +Mt+1/Pt ≤ ntεt +Mt/Pt + τt (1.2)
ct ≥ 0, Mt+1 ≥ 0
The utility function used in this paper is originally proposed by Green-












where σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and ν is the intertemporal
(Frisch) elasticity of labor supply. As it will be shown later, this selection of
utility function allows, in equilibrium, the labor supply decision to be inde-
pendent of the asset level of an individual.
The government changes money supply such that prices change accord-
ing to the committed inflation rate πt = Pt+1/Pt. Particularly, government
applies the following operation:
7
M st+1 = (1 + ξt)M
s
t (1.4)
and has the following nominal budget constraint:
Tt = Ptτt = M
s
t+1 −M st (1.5)
where Tt and τt are nominal and real transfers/taxes, respectively. That is,
government transfers the seignorage revenue back to households in a lump-sum
fashion. This is the key point in understanding the redistribution mechanism
and its role in political equilibrium outcome. Particularly, poorer households
will enjoy a higher inflation rate, at least for the first few periods. One can
see from the budget constraint (1.2) that the money held loses its purchasing
power next period in case of a positive inflation and inflation acts as a tax
on savings in this model. The consumption loss due to inflation tax is lower
than the transfers for poorer households compared to richer households. For
economies with median wealth level sufficiently lower than mean wealth level,
more individuals will ask for a higher inflation rate due to this mechanism.
On the other hand, it should be noted that since the government is
assumed to have full commitment and there is no aggregate uncertainty, i.e.
there is perfect information about the actions taken by the government and
agents can foresee the resulting price changes stemming from the government’s
actions. Since agents only care about the real variables in the economy, only
the inflation rate matters for them. Therefore, we can think of the government
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setting (and committing to) the inflation rate even though the prices are ac-
tually set in the competitive market. For better readability, I’ll use only real
variables in recursive competitive equilibrium and exchange the government
policy (ξ) with perceived inflation rate (π) in individual’s information set in
the subsection below.
1.2.2 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Now, I will introduce the recursive interpretation of the model. Time
subscripts are suppressed and x denotes xt, x
′ denotes xt+1. The individual
state space can be represented simply by (m, ε).
Let the joint distribution of asset levels and productivity shocks be
denoted by Γ(m, ε) with law of motion Γ′ = H(Γ, π). So, the aggregate labor
supply is given by:
N =
∫
εn dΓ(k, ε) (1.6)
Then, the dynamic programming problem solved by agents can be writ-
ten as:
9
V (m, ε; Γ, π) = max
c,n,m′
U(c, n) + βEε′|εV (m
′, ε′; Γ′, π′)
s.t.
c+m′(1 + π) = nε+m+ τ
Γ′ = H(Γ, π)
π′ = Ψ(Γ, π)
c ≥ 0, m′ ≥ 0
(1.7)
where Ψ is the function of the perceived law of motion of inflation.
The solution to this problem generate the following decision rules:
m′ = ζ(m, ε; Γ, π), c = ω(m, ε; Γ, π) and n = η(m, ε; Γ, π)
Finally, the resource constraint is formulated as below:∫
ω dΓ(m, ε) =
∫
ηε dΓ(m, ε) (1.8)
Next, I define the recursive competitive equilibrium for the given per-
ceived law of motion of inflation:
Definition 1.2.1 (RCE). Given Ψ(Γ, π), a Recursive Competitive Equi-
librium is a set of functions {V, ζ, ω, η,H, τ} such that:
1. Given (Γ, τ,H,Ψ), functions {V, ζ, ω, η} solve the individual optimiza-
tion problem defined in (1.7);
2. The resource constraint (1.8) is satisfied;
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3. The government budget constraint (1.5) is satisfied;





1.2.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
The problem defined above has the following first order conditions:
Uc(c, n) = λ (1.9)
Un(c, n) + ελ = 0 (1.10)
λ(1 + π) = βEε′|εVm′(m
′, ε′) (1.11)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint On the other




. Combining first order conditions (1.9) and (1.10), and







Equation (1.12) has an important implication. Particularly, labor sup-
ply decision is independent of the cash at hand. Since it depends only on
individual’s productivity shock, there are S types of individual labor supply
11










where Π is the invariant probability distribution. This simplification has a
significant computational tractability. Individual optimization is computed
for given aggregate quantities, aggregate labor is fixed due to the particular
assumption on preferences. Without this form of utility function, another state
variable would be needed.
Second, more productive agents work more (n is an increasing function
of ε for any positive parameter value of ν). This is simply because the substi-
tution effect dominates the income effect, it is more costly to enjoy leisure for
the agents with higher return to work (ε is the return to allocate unit time to
work). Finally, we can clearly see from (1.12) and (1.13) that labor supply de-
cision is independent on the inflation rate. Clearly, inflation has more adverse
effects in a model where labor supply is distorted by inflation.
Euler equation can be derived from (1.11) and (1.9):
Uc(c, n)(1 + π) = βEε′|εUc′(c
′, n′) (1.14)
Interpretation of the Euler equation is standard. Precisely, individu-
als equate the marginal cost of increasing savings to the marginal benefit of
increased consumption tomorrow.
Next, I will define the politico economic equilibrium by endogenizing
the inflation rate.
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1.2.4 Politico Economic Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The main contribution of this study is endogenizing the inflation rate in
a political economy concept. Particularly, individuals vote for the inflation rate
which will maximize their lifetime utility. For simplicity, I restrict my attention
to the case where voting takes place only once and the chosen inflation rate
is permanent7. Parallel to the literature in this subject, I assume that the
median voter is the decisive voter.
As mentioned in detail in Corbae et al. (2009), the median voter can
not be known by examining the asset levels or other individual state variables.
Specifically, the median voter outcome is determined by computing the infla-
tion rate that each individual would choose and then by ordering the votes.
The median of the most preferred inflation rates, in general, is different than
what the individual with median asset level would choose.
At the time of the elections, households with state (m, ε; Γ, π) compute
their values for different alternatives of future inflation rates which the gov-
ernment will commit for lifetime, not necessarily determined by the perceived
law of motion π′ = Ψ(Γ, π), but some other rate, π′. Then, the individuals’
problem is to optimize:
7For more detailed alternative mechanisms, see Corbae et al. (2009).
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Ṽ (m, ε; Γ, π, π′) = max
c,n,m′
U(c, n) + βV (m′, ε′; Γ′, π′)
s.t.
c+m′(1 + π) = nε+m+ τ
Γ′ = H̃(Γ, π, π′)
(1.15)
where H̃ is the election-period law of motion of Γ induced by deviating from
Ψ. All future evolutions of distributions are determined by H such that:
Γ′ = H̃(Γ, π, π′)
Γ′′ = H(H̃(Γ, π, π′), τ ′)
Γ′′′ = H[H(H̃(Γ, π, π′), τ ′), τ ′]
...
The solution to this problem generates the following decision rules:
m = ζ̃(m, ε; Γ, π, π′), c = ω̃(m, ε; Γ, π, π′) andn = η̃(m, ε; Γ, π, π′)
It is now time to define the politico-economic RCE.
Definition 1.2.2 (PRCE). Given Ψ(Γ, π), a Politico-Economic Recursive
Competitive Equilibrium is such that:
1. A set of functions {V, ζ, ω, η,H, τ} that constitute a RCE;
2. A set of functions {Ṽ , ζ̃, ω̃, η̃} that solve (1.15) at prices which clear
markets and the government budget constraint;
14





with continuation values satisfying (i);
4. Household i with individual state (m, ε)i chooses the inflation rate π
i
where
πi = argmaxπ′Ṽ ((m, ε)i; Γ, π, π
′);
5. The policy is determined by the median of the most preferred inflation







Single-peaked preferences is essential for the existence of politico-economic
equilibrium. Figure 1.1 depicts the indirect utility function for individuals with
median money holding evaluated at 1.0% inflation rate. The single-peakedness
can be observed from this figure. Moreover, indirect utility of the individual
with median asset level and the higher productivity shock peaks at a lower
inflation rate. Now, I define the steady state politico-economic recursive com-
petitive equilibrium.
Definition 1.2.3 (SSPRCE). A Steady State PRCE is a PRCE such that
Γ∗ = H(Γ∗, π∗) and π∗ = Ψ(Γ∗, π∗).
The next section introduces the parametrization used in this paper.
15
Figure 1.1: Single-peaked preferences
1.3 Parametrization
I parameterize the model for the US economy. The model period is one
year. Calibrated parameter values of aggregate economy are given in Table
1.1. The calibrations of β, and σ are pretty much standard in the literature.
MaCurdy (1981) estimates the intertemporal Frisch elasticity ν to be between
0.1 and 0.45. I choose this parameter to be 0.3 similar to Corbae et al. (2009).
Disutility parameter χ is chosen to match the aggregate labor supply8
1/3.
8Corbae et al. (2009) takes a higher χ value but targets a similar aggregate labor supply
level.
16
Table 1.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Discount Factor β 0.96
Risk aversion σ 1.0
Elasticity of labor supply ν 0.3
Disutility χ 43
Parameters regarding the idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks are
taken from Davila et al. (2005), where they calibrate the economy in Aiyagari
(1994) using a three-state Markov process (instead of seven in the original
Aiyagari paper). These parameter values are presented in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Labor Productivity Parameters
Value Transition Probabilities
ε1(0.78) 0.66 0.27 0.07
ε2(1.00) 0.28 0.44 0.28
ε3(1.27) 0.07 0.27 0.66
1.4 Results
This section presents the main findings of the paper. The compu-
tational algorithm to compute equilibria in political economy framework is
standard and explained in detail in the relevant papers listed above. The al-
gorithm used in this paper is similar to them except for a few slight differences.
In particular, there is one continuous state and one discrete state for individu-
als while aggregate states are the distribution of agents and the inflation rate.
The computation procedure consists of the following stages. First, steady state
17
Figure 1.2: Aggregate money supply transition
recursive competitive equilibria are solved for an initial grid of inflation rates9.
Second, transitions from each steady state to others are computed. In order
to do that, I take 50 as the maximum number of periods to reach steady state
and do backward induction10. Figure 1.2 shows a sample transition of the
aggregate real money supply transition from 0% inflation rate to 1.0%. Third,
PRCE is computed. Specifically, individual votes found by comparing their
values at the beginning of the transitions for each initial steady state. Finally,
SSPRCE is found for the given grid of inflation rates. If the median of the
most preferred inflation rates is found to be on the boundary of the grid, i.e.
the lowest or the highest inflation rate in the grid is chosen, then the grid is
adjusted until an interior solution is attained.
9I choose 10−12, 10−6 and 10−6 for tolerance values while computing steady state value
functions, aggregate values in steady state and aggregate values in transition, respectively.
10Transition in longer time periods are also computed but convergence to a new steady
state is satisfied before 50 periods.
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My results suggest that the median voter chooses 1.1% inflation rate
for the calibrated US economy. The social planner chooses the Friedman to
be optimal in this economy. This corresponds to an inflation rate of −4.17%.
Clearly, the median voter outcome underpredicts the average inflation observed
in US data. The main reason for this is that saving money is the only tool for
risk sharing in this model economy and therefore inflation tax on savings has an
amplified effect. Under a richer environment with more tools for risk sharing,
this effect would be smaller and the median voter outcome inflation rate would
be closer to data. As it will be shown in the next section, this result is robust
to parameter selection, that is a positive inflation rate is always supported by
the model for the relevant partition of the parameter space. That’s because
through its redistributive feature, inflation transfers resources from the rich to
the poor and the median voter is poorer than the mean agent.
1.5 Sensitivity Analysis
This section tests the robustness of the results. Specifically, several
values of the key parameters are fed into the algorithm and the results are
analyzed. The sensitivity of the results are examined for two parameters,
namely σ, and ν. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show equilibrium inflation rates chosen
by the median voter for several values of these two parameters, changing only
one of them at a time.
The sensitivity analysis shows that the results are robust to parameter
value selection. Specifically, a positive inflation rate can be supported by
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Table 1.3: Sensitivity of the Results for Different σ Values




the median voter outcome. As we examine Table 1.3, we observe that as
the relative risk aversion parameter increases, the median voter chooses a
higher inflation rate. This is intuitive because as individuals become more risk
averse, a higher degree of insurance is needed. Since inflation acts as a partial
insurance mechanism in this model, a higher σ leads to a higher inflation rate
to be chosen politically.
Table 1.4: Sensitivity of the Results for Different ν Values




Table 1.4, on the other hand, examines sensitivity of the results to
intertemporal Frisch elasticity. As the elasticity parameter value increases,
median voter inflation decreases. The results are robust to the selection of
this parameter too, a positive inflation rate can still be supported.
1.6 Conclusion
Inflation rate in US has been consistently positive after WWII. As-
suming that inflation can precisely be determined by monetary policy, this
observation is inconsistent with the Friedman rule. This paper argues that
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this inconsistency is a result of a political process where agents vote for the
inflation rate. In order to show this, I used an incomplete markets general equi-
librium model in a political economy framework and calibrated it to US data.
Results provide evidence that the model can support the observed positive
inflation rate. Equilibrium inflation rate delivered by the model underpredicts
average inflation in data mainly due to the fact that being the only tool for risk
sharing, money demand is highly affected by the inflation tax in this model
economy. Under a richer environment with more tools for risk sharing, this
effect would be smaller.
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Chapter 2
Effects of Monetary Unions on Inequalities
2.1 Introduction
The formation of the European Monetary Union has been an impor-
tant motivation for many researchers. Various aspects of unions have been
analyzed, and researchers have tried to characterize benefits and costs of join-
ing a monetary union. Benefits from improvements in microeconomic efficiency
and increase in macroeconomic stability and growth along with possible re-
lated costs have been studied for the last four decades. A detailed analysis
on the costs and benefits of monetary unions was performed by De Grauwe
(2007). Among others, the issue of inequality is a highly important yet undis-
covered aspect that comes to mind especially when one takes into account that
each country has a unique demographic structure. We show in this study that
those differences in demographics combined with the adoption of a common
currency will affect consumption and earnings inequalities in each country in
a different way. In our setting, there are benefits from forming a union since
using a common currency eliminates the portfolio adjustment costs. Commit-
ting to a common currency leads to these gains at the expense of monetary
policy autonomy where countries cannot use inflation as a tool to redistribute
resources. Instead, the common central bank has control over the inflation
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level.
In this study, we use a theoretical model to explore the question: ”How
does forming a monetary union affect the consumption and earnings inequal-
ities in countries with asymmetric demographic structures?”. We employ a
heterogenous agents environment to study the effects of inflation with redistri-
bution through transfers. A two-country dynamic equilibrium open-economy
model is used to analyze different outcomes that monetary unions will pro-
duce. In a similar setting to Cooper and Kempf (2003), we use an OLG model
with two open-economy countries. Ex-ante identical individuals receive private
information productivity shocks. The monetary authority, unable to utilize op-
timal risk-sharing, maximizes domestic welfare. Individuals try to maximize
their utility by selecting an optimal portfolio of currencies before the realiza-
tion of their taste shocks on domestic and foreign consumption goods. Rich
individuals, holding more money, suffer from a high inflation while poor indi-
viduals benefit from it as it leads to higher lump-sum transfers1. Without a
monetary union, each government sets inefficiently high inflation tax (beggar
thy neighbor policy), creating comparably lower inequality. Poor individu-
als gain from inflation tax through higher transfers when independent policy
makers compete.
1Existence of asymmetric information renders the fiscal redistributive tools ineffective
and leaves the money as the only way of transferring wealth from rich to poor. As Bhat-
tacharya et al. (2005b) prove this point in their paper, under heterogeneity of agents and
the lack of fiscal tools to redistribute wealth among agents, Friedman’s rule is no longer
optimal since inflation is the only way to redistribute wealth among agents.
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Researchers studied the welfare effects of forming a monetary union,
but none of them analyzed the distributional aspects in a structural model set-
ting. Relevant literature on unions suggests that forming a common currency
area might eliminate the welfare costs associated with competing monetary
policies2. Independent monetary authorities optimize domestic welfare by im-
plementing a higher inflation rate to gain from terms of trade. This finding is
supported by Cooley and Quadrini (2003) using dependent production tech-
nologies in different countries, and by Celentani et al. (2007) through interna-
tional risk-sharing with incomplete markets. Monetary unions eliminate those
losses created by competing monetary policies and lead to a lower inflation-
higher welfare outcome. Following Mundell (1961), Cooper and Kempf (2003)
obtained the welfare improving results by eliminating local currency and port-
folio adjustment constraints through forming a monetary union. Our model
differs from the existing literature in two ways: First, we use a heterogenous
agents model to analyze consumption and earnings inequalities where there
are two types of agents with different productivity levels. Second, we allow
for asymmetry among countries in terms of their fractions of types, so that
interests of the union and its member countries do not match perfectly.
Even though there is not much question about the importance of the
distributional aspects of inflation, there is no commonly agreed way of mod-
eling it. One basic distinction concerns the losers and winners of inflation.
Meh and Terajima (2008) found that the distributional effects of inflation are
2For a rich and recent literature survey on monetary unions, see Mongelli (2005).
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sizeable even for low and moderate inflation episodes. Old households, rich
households, and the middle-aged middle-class lose with inflation, largely due
to their sizeable holdings of bonds and non-indexed defined benefit pension
assets. Erosa and Ventura (2002) study the link between inflation and in-
equality in a model where poor households hold more cash as a fraction of
their total assets than rich households do, and deal with the effect of antici-
pated inflation on cash holdings. There is no redistribution through any means
and as a result, the poor are the losers of inflation. Albanesi (2007) takes a
similar approach, but uses a political economy model wherein the higher vul-
nerability of the poor against inflation results in lower bargaining power and
a bigger loss from inflation in equilibrium. On the other hand, Doepke and
Schneider (2006b) argue that cash is only a very small portion of the portfo-
lio for nominal assets, hence rich and old people are the main losers due to
unanticipated inflation, along with foreigners that hold domestic assets. Also,
Albanesi (2003) shows that unanticipated changes in the price level do affect
consumption allocation, since they redistribute wealth across agents with dif-
ferent outstanding levels of nominal claims on the government. In our model,
similar to the latter approach, highly productive individuals suffer more from
higher inflation, because they hold more nominal assets than agents with low
productivity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
introduces our model and defines the local currency equilibrium. Section 2.3
analyzes the inequality effects of inflation in the local currency case. Section
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2.4 studies the equilibrium and inequalities in a monetary union. Section 2.5
concludes the paper.
2.2 The Model
We describe the model economy in this section. An overlapping gener-
ations structure is implemented in a two country open-economy setting. All
agents live for two periods in which they work when they are young and con-
sume when they are old. Individuals consume both home and foreign produced
perishable goods and are subject to ex-ante taste shocks that determine how
much utility they get from consumption of each good. Taste shocks are real-
ized once the first period ends, and only after the portfolio choices are already
made3. Taste shocks do not create heterogeneity in work and portfolio choices
since these are made before taste shocks are realized. However, individuals are
born with a productivity shock which is unobservable to others and determines
how much they can produce when young. Different levels of productivity do
provide different levels of work and consumption decisions. Countries, named
as “home” and “foreign”, issue their own currency and require domestic goods
to be purchased by their own currency (local currency (LC) constraint) 4.
There are two key assumptions to our analysis. The first one is full
commitment technology through which government announces money growth
3This timing friction accounts for the costs to adjust portfolio in exchange markets and
renders the use of a single currency beneficial for both countries.
4This assumption is essential for portfolio choice to be important.
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rate at the beginning of time (once and for all). Therefore agents know how
much transfer they will be receiving next period. Transfers are financed by
printing new money in that period. The second key assumption is that labor
is immobile.
Timing is as follows: Cohort t individuals are born at time t, observe
their productivity types, make their labor and portfolio decisions based on
their expectations about idiosyncratic taste shocks. Young agents of cohort t
sell their output to old agents of cohort t− 1 in the goods market for home
currency only, and then go to the exchange market to get foreign currency
according to their portfolio decisions. At the beginning of time t+ 1, they
observe their taste shocks, receive transfers from the government and go to
the goods market for buying home and foreign goods 5. Since the exchange
market is closed transfers can only be used to purchase domestic goods.
2.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical households in each cohort.
Each individual in cohort t starts their first period by observing their pro-
ductivity type, i ∈ {g, b} representing good and bad, and give labor decision
nt before observing their taste for domestic goods consumption θ, which is
realized at the beginning of time t + 1. We assume that the proportion of
good and bad type agents in a country is time invariant and publicly known.
5Note that portfolios cannot be adjusted in the second period after seeing the idiosyn-
cratic taste shocks
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We denote the proportion of good type home agents as γ. Due to the cash-
in-advance constraint, they give their domestic and foreign currency holding
decisions (mh,it and m
f,i
t , respectively) at time t as well. Therefore, an i type







Eθ{θln(ch,it+1) + (1− θ)ln(c
f,i
t+1)} − g(nit) (2.1)

















t ≥ 0; nit ∈ [0, 1].
Disutility from work g(nit) in the maximization problem (2.1) is in-
creasing in labor, that is g′(nit) > 0, and strictly convex, g
′′(nit) > 0. c
h,i
t+1
and cf,it+1 stand for domestic and foreign good consumption levels, respectively.
θ is the idiosyncratic taste shock which determines the utility received from
consuming domestic good and assumed to be distributed independently across
countries, cohorts and agents from a distribution H(θ) with mean θ. Output yit
is determined by the first constraint where αi is the individual specific private
information productivity level. Price levels in consumption equations (2.2) are
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denoted by pt+1 for domestic price level and p
∗
t+1 for foreign price level
6. τt+1 is
the transfer to old agents at time t+ 17. The last equation (2.3) identifies the
portfolio decision, young agents convert their output to domestic and foreign
currency where et stands for the nominal exchange rate.













The first condition (2.4) equates marginal disutility from work today to
marginal utility of an additional unit of labor in terms of home good consump-
tion. The second condition (2.5), on the other hand, relates the consumption
shares to their ratio of expected costs. Note that they depend on the expec-
tation of the taste shock because decisions are given ex-ante.
2.2.2 Market Clearing
There are five markets cleared each period, two goods markets, two
money markets and and one exchange market. Home and foreign goods market
clearing conditions are as follows:
6We use asterisk (*) for foreign country variables.
7Note that government delivers the same amount of transfers to all types since type is
unobservable. This creates re-distributional effects for monetary policy.
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Mt = pt[γα




∗αgn∗gt + (1− γ∗)αbn∗bt ]
Money markets clearing conditions are defined by:
Mt = γm
h,g
t + (1− γ)m
h,b
t + γ





t + (1− γ)m
f,b
t + γ
∗m∗f,gt + (1− γ∗)m
∗f,b
t
Exchange market has the following clearing condition:




t + (1− γ)m
f,b
t ]
Home money stock evolves as:
Mt+1 = Mt(1 + σ)
where σ is the fixed rate of money growth set by the home government. We
assume governments follow balanced budgets, therefore tomorrow’s transfers
are directly financed by money injection. That is,
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τt+1 = Mtσ
Before we move on to the equilibrium section, it is useful to define
portfolio shares so that we can talk about real variables in the steady state.
Let φi (φ∗i) denote the share of domestic (foreign) money stock held by type














denotes the fraction of home currency held inside the country.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
We restrict our attention to steady state monetary equilibria. Given the
rates of money growth rates σ and σ∗, we will first characterize the monetary
steady state equilibrium, and then we will solve the government’s problem to
find the optimal level of money growth.
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2.2.3.1 Monetary Steady State Equilibrium
Given money growth rates σ and σ∗, a monetary steady state equilib-
rium is a list of consumption allocations (ch,g, ch,b, cf,g, cf,b, c∗h,g, c∗h,b, c∗f,g, c∗f,b),
portfolio shares (φg, φb, φ∗g, φ∗b), employment decisions (ng, nb, n∗g, n∗b) and a




t=1 such that individual optimization conditions
(2.4) and (2.5) are satisfied and market clearing conditions given above are
met. The following proposition ensures an interior monetary equilibrium ex-
ists in which people hold both home and foreign currency.
Proposition 2.2.1. For every (σ ∈ (−1, 1/Z), σ∗ ∈ (−1, 1/Z)) there exists a








Steady state employment levels (for home and foreign) are the unique
solution to these set of equations:
αg
g′(ng)
= αgng(1 + σγ) + αbnb(σ(1− γ)) (2.9)
αb
g′(nb)
= αbnb(1 + σ(1− γ)) + αgng(σγ) (2.10)
and the consumption levels satisfy:
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, Y = γαgng + (1− γ)αbnb
Proof. See Appendix.
Looking at the consumption equation, we see that out of total home
production Y , θ proportion goes to home agents, and the rest goes to foreign
agents. γκ(σ) and (1 − γκ(σ)) determine per capita consumption shares of
good and bad type agents in the economy, respectively. We will later prove that
κ(σ) is greater than one, meaning that good types will always be consuming
more than bad types.
2.2.3.2 Determination of Equilibrium Inflation Rates
Now we can turn to the government’s problem. Utilitarian government
for home country will be choosing the level of inflation to maximize:
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V LC(σ, σ∗) =Eθ{γ(θln(ch,g) + (1− θ)ln(cf,g))
+ (1− γ)(θln(ch,b) + (1− θ)ln(cf,b))}
− γg(ng)− (1− γ)g(nb)
(2.13)
Government maximizes the weighted average expected utility of a generation
t population. Choice of generation does not really matter as any two genera-
tions are ex-ante identical, due to our assumption about timing of government
announcing σ, once and for all in the very beginning.
Proposition 2.2.2. Equilibrium level of σ that solves government’s problem
(2.13) is strictly positive and independent of the level of foreign inflation level.
Proof. See Appendix.
Equilibrium money growth rate is strictly positive because of two effects
that stem from the basic structure of our model. Terms of trade effect in our
model is especially strong due to Cobb-Douglas utility function assumption,
therefore an inelastic portion of the foreign portfolio is being held in home
currency and government will want to tax that. A second effect for positive
inflation is that, even in the absence of terms of trade effect, inflation tax is the
only way government can redistribute wealth and choose the optimum level of
allocations in the economy.
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2.3 Inequality Effects of Inflation, LC Case
We now turn our attention to how individual decision rules respond
to changes in inflation level. In particular, we prove in this section that the
consumption and earnings inequalities decrease as inflation rises. First, we
show that high productive agents work more than low productive agents.
Proposition 2.3.1. At any level of positive inflation, good types work more
than bad types, that is:
ng ≥ nb








When inflation equals zero, income and substitution effects of a higher α
cancel each other out due to logarithmic utility. Therefore good and bad types
work the same amount. However, for positive inflation levels, the amount of
transfers are proportionately higher for bad types than it is for good types, so
income effect dominates substitution effect, for both types. Especially for the
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poor, transfers are a higher proportion of their wealth, so their work decision
is distorted more, as income effect dominates substitution effect even more for
them. As a result, good types work more than bad types at positive inflation
levels.
As stated in the second part of the proposition, inflation distorts labor
supply decisions for both types. This is a standard result stemming from
decreased returns to work with higher inflation. Next, we show that they
actually consume more than the bad types as well.
Proposition 2.3.2. Good type agents consume more of both goods in any




< 1 ∀ σ ≥ 0
and κ(σ) is decreasing in σ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that κ(σ) and (1−γκ(σ))
1−γ are per capita consumption shares of both
home and foreign production for good and bad types, respectively. This propo-
sition suggests that, at any inflation rate, the shares for good types are always
greater than those of low types. As good types work more than bad types,
8Actually this is true for all levels of inflation, but negative inflation levels are never an
outcome of a steady state monetary equilibrium.
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and their productivity level is higher, they will hold more money and consume
more.
More importantly, the gap between those shares converge to zero as
inflation goes up. There are two effects working in opposite directions. First,
bad types decrease their production levels more than good types. However the
second effect, i.e. the transfer effect, dominates the first effect as the decrease
in labor levels is less than order one, so transfers go up despite the decrease
in production levels. As a result, consumption gap decreases.
Now we will analyze the distributional effects of inflation. We use two
different measures of inequality. The first one, earnings inequality, is a measure
of pre-transfer income inequality which effectively focuses on distortionary
effects of inflation on work decisions. The second one, consumption inequality,
measures inequality in consumption levels which is equivalent to disposable
income in our model9.
Definition 2.3.1. Earnings inequality is defined as
∆E.I. = α
gng − αbnb
Let µ ∈ [0, 1] be any consumption weight of domestic good used in forming a
consumption basket. Then, consumption inequality defined as:
∆C.I. = (µc
h,g + (1− µ)cf,g)− (µch,b + (1− µ)cf,b)
9Our model is a static one where all earnings are saved when young and consumed when
old. Hence, disposable income is completely spent on consumption.
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Lemma 2.3.3. For any σ ≥ 0, ng − nb is an increasing function of inflation.
Proof. See Appendix.
That is, as inflation rises, bad types decrease their labor decisions more
than good types do. This is because of our convexity of disutility assumption
(equivalently, concavity of utility from leisure). For a given level of decrease in
marginal utility from consumption due to higher transfers, individuals decrease
their marginal utility from leisure as well. Already enjoying a higher level of
leisure, bad types increase their leisure more compared to good type agents.
Based on our definitions of inequalities, we present our main result of
this section. Particularly, we prove that inequality decreases with inflation
under local currency case 10.
Proposition 2.3.4. For any σ ≥ 0, ∆E.I. and ∆C.I. are decreasing functions
of inflation in the local currency case.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, relative price of one unit of leisure in terms of home con-
sumption good, i.e. αi/(1 + σ), is higher for good types than bad types.
10We will prove the common currency counterpart of this result in the next section.
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Moreover, the gap between these two prices is decreasing in inflation. So, at
a higher inflation rate, real returns to work for good and bad types will be
closer to each other. Individual optimality requires marginal rate of substitu-
tion between leisure and consumption to be equal to their relative prices. As a
result, as those relative price ratios for different types converge to each other,
and through Lemma 2.3.3, consumption levels should get closer.
2.4 Common Currency (CC) Case
Now we analyze the effects of using a common currency on inflation
levels and inequalities. We assume that countries differ only in their fractions
of types11, i.e. γ 6= γ∗. This assumption is sufficient for us to analyze the
distributional aspects of monetary union for countries with different inequality
levels12. Agreeing to a common currency arrangement will imply the use of a
single currency issued and governed by a single monetary authority. We will
show that the adoption of a common currency will not lead to Friedman Rule,
unlike previous literature, due to heterogeneity. Individual problem of a type







Eθ{θln(ch,it+1(θ)) + (1− θ)ln(c
f,i
t+1)(θ)} − g(nit) (2.14)
11We assume that individuals have the same taste distribution across countries.
12Given this setup, each country will have a separate optimum level of inflation in the
local currency case because they need different levels of redistribution across types.
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t+1 ≡ I it+1 , ∀ θ.
where qht , q
f
t represent home and foreign good prices at time t, respectively,
τ cct+1 is transfer
13 and I it+1 is total disposable income of a type i agent at time
t + 1. In this setting, individuals no longer face the need to choose their
portfolio before they see their preference realization. This leads to a two step
decision making process where, for given values of θ and I it+1, we first get the








and then we plug this consumption levels into the optimization problem and










13It is assumed that per capita nominal transfers are distributed evenly among member
countries.
40
Note here that optimal consumption decisions are functions of observed
taste shocks, θs, rather than their expected levels as it was the case under local
currency. The portfolio adjustment friction no longer exists and individuals
hold their nominal money balances in the form of a single currency and decide
how much to buy from each good when they are old.
Under common currency, there are three markets cleared each period,
two goods markets and one money market. Home and foreign goods market
clearing conditions are as follows:
θ(γIgt+1 + (1− γ)Ibt+1) + (1− θ)(γ∗I
∗g
t+1 + (1− γ∗)I∗bt+1) = qht+1Y
(1− θ)(γIgt+1 + (1− γ)Ibt+1) + θ(γ∗I
∗g




Money market clearing condition is defined by:
M cct = γI
g
t + (1− γ)Ibt + γ∗I
∗g
t + (1− γ∗)I∗bt
Money stock evolves as:
M cct+1 = M
cc
t (1 + σ
cc)
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Assuming the monetary union follow balanced budgets, tomorrow’s
transfers are directly financed by money injection. That is,




2.4.1 Common Currency Equilibrium
We now define the common currency steady state equilibrium. Given
money growth rate σcc, we will first characterize the equilibrium, and then
solve the government’s problem to find the optimal level of money growth rate
in the monetary union.
2.4.1.1 Common Currency Steady State Equilibrium
Given money growth rate σcc, a common currency steady state equilib-
rium is a list of consumption allocations (ch,g, ch,b, cf,g, cf,b, c∗h,g, c∗h,b, c∗f,g, c∗f,b),





that individual optimization conditions (2.15) and (2.16) are satisfied and mar-
ket clearing conditions given above are met.
Proposition 2.4.1. For every σcc > −1 there exists a unique common cur-
rency steady state equilibrium where the steady state employment levels are the
unique solution to these set of equations:
αg
g′(ng)




= αbnb(1 + σcc(1− γ)) + αgng(σccγ) (2.18)
αg
g′(n∗g)
= αgn∗g(1 + σccγ∗) + αbn∗b(σcc(1− γ∗)) (2.19)
αb
g′(n∗b)
= αbn∗b(1 + σcc(1− γ∗)) + αgn∗g(σccγ∗) (2.20)
Proof. See Appendix.
Due to inelastic and symmetric portfolio shares (i.e. the same distribu-
tion of θs across countries), we have a balanced trade scheme (i.e. net exports
are zero) and nominal outputs are equal qhY = qfY ∗. The reason behind the
balanced trade is that, on average, they enjoy each others’ good evenly and the
portion of transfers that countries spend on each other are equal14. Essentially,
there are no intercountry transfers in steady state and total money demands
are equal in both countries. Therefore, steady state employment levels are
determined by equations similar to the ones in local currency case. In other
words, equations 2.17-2.20 are analogous to 2.9-2.10.
In this setup, government’s problem becomes:
14If taste distributions were asymmetric, we would have trade imbalances and intercountry
transfers. In that case, it would be harder to isolate the distributional effects we are after.
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V CC(σ) =Eθ{γ(θln(ch,g) + (1− θ)ln(cf,g))
+ (1− γ)(θln(ch,b) + (1− θ)ln(cf,b))
+ γ∗(θln(c∗f,g) + (1− θ)ln(c∗h,g))
+ (1− γ∗)(θln(c∗f,b) + (1− θ)ln(c∗h,b))}
− γg(ng)− (1− γ)g(nb)− γ∗g(n∗g)− (1− γ∗)g(n∗b)
(2.21)
The only difference in government’s problem compared to the previous
case is that the population doubled. However, if we plug the consumption
levels in this objective function, we will see that σ will now affect both country
production levels and there is no benefit of high inflation through the channel
it was beneficial in the previous case (i.e. inflation tax on foreigners).
Proposition 2.4.2. The optimal level of money growth rate in a common
currency area is strictly positive and cannot be greater than the local currency
equilibrium levels of money growth rates in both countries.
0 < σcc < max{σLC , σ∗LC}
Proof. See Appendix.
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Here σLC and σ∗LC are optimal money growth rates in the pre-common
currency case for home and foreign countries, respectively. This proposition
states that the inflation rate has to go down in at least one of the countries
after forming the monetary union. In other words, when two countries with
different population ratios of good types decide to form a monetary union,
optimum level of inflation for the union will either be lower than or in between
the local currency inflation levels.
There are two key parameters which determine where the optimum
inflation will fall when they switch to use a common currency. First one is
θ, which is decisive about how dependent the countries are on each other and
how much benefit there is to gain from forming a monetary union. The higher
the dependency is, the more likely it is that the inflation will fall below the
pre-union inflation rates in both countries. This result stems from the fact that
the common currency level of inflation is independent of the dependency ratio
(1− θ), therefore it will fall to a certain level regardless of the initial inflation
levels. So, the higher the initial levels of inflation are, the more likely it is to
experience a fall in inflation for both countries. On the other hand, in cases
where the initial levels of inflation were low (very little beggar-thy-neighbor
policy due to high θs), the country with the lower initial rate of inflation is
more likely to experience a rise in the inflation level. Therefore, as we prove
later, level of inequality in each country might fall or rise after joining the
union depending on this parameter.
The second key parameter is the productivity ratio of good and bad
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types15, i.e. αg/αb. This ratio determines the intensity of inflationary policy
needed to redistribute resources between the types. The higher this ratio is,
the more likely it is that the common currency level of inflation falls in between
the local currency levels. The reason behind this finding is the concavity of
the value function with respect to σ. As there are two effects determining the
optimal inflation level in the local currency case (heterogeneity and beggar-
thy-neighbor policy) and heterogeneity is the only source of positive inflation
in the common currency case, the latter is amplified more with a higher pro-
ductivity ratio of types. Therefore, as countries form a monetary union in an
environment with a higher ratio of productivity levels, it is more probable that
inflation will go up in one of the countries, and levels of inequalities will move
in opposite directions.
Figure 2.1 depicts the frontier which separates the possible cases into
two areas for common currency inflation level16. The area to the left of the
frontier contains the parameters for which the common currency level of infla-
tion is lower than the local currency optimum inflation levels of both countries.
For the parameters that lie to the right, the common currency inflation level
might fall in between the local currency optimum inflation levels. For param-
eters on the right side of the frontier, if the two countries have sufficiently
different levels of heterogeneity (determined by γ and γ∗), inflation levels will
15Note that the optimum level of inflation depends only on the ratio of productivities, not
their levels.
16We used g(n) = 92n
2 to match the steady state equilibrium employment levels to 1/3
when there is no inflation.
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Figure 2.1: Sensitivity Analysis
go in opposite directions in the two countries. The country with the more
symmetric distribution of types, e.g. γ = 0.5, will experience a fall in inflation
after joining the monetary union while the other country, e.g. γ = 0.1 or
γ = 0.9, will have a higher inflation.
There are two effects determining the new inflation rate. The first one
is the elimination of the trade frictions. This is a reducing effect on inflation
for both countries. Because countries can not tax foreigners through mone-
tary policy in the common currency case. The other one is the distributional
effect. This effect moves in opposite directions for the two countries unless
the countries are identical (distributional effect is zero in this special case).
For the more unequal country, distributional effect is going to be negative
47
because joining a monetary union with a more equal country will lead to a
lower common currency inflation rate. Hence the two effects work in the same
direction and result in a decrease in inflation for the more unequal country.
The more equal country, however, will experience an increasing distributional
effect on inflation. Therefore, for a given set of parameters that lie to the
right of the frontier depicted in the figure above, the more equal country will
have an increase in inflation if the two countries are sufficiently different in
inequalities.
Now we will state our main proposition of this paper. This result is the
counterpart of proposition 2.3.4, and shows that inequalities are decreasing in
inflation in the common currency case as well. Moreover, we show that one can
simply compare the measures of earnings and consumption inequalities before
and after the formation of common currency, therefore differences between the
two steady states can be analyzed.
Proposition 2.4.3. As defined in 2.3.1, ∆E.I. and ∆C.I. are decreasing func-
tions of inflation for any σ ≥ 0 in the common currency case.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note here that, ∆E.I. and ∆C.I. have the same exact responses to σ as
in the local currency case. In other words, one can compare the inequality
levels only by looking at the changes in inflation rates.
Combining propositions 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, possible outcomes of establish-
ing a common currency area can be analyzed in terms of inequalities. Since
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inequalities respond to inflation monotonically, either both countries will have
a higher inequality due to lower inflation or inequalities will move in opposite
directions depending on the aforementioned conditions.
Even without any trade frictions that exist in the local currency case,
a positive inflation rate would be desirable in this environment due to existing
heterogeneity. That is, Friedman rule does not apply here because a positive
amount of redistribution increases total welfare due to concavity. Countries
with different demographics (i.e. different γs) need different amounts of trans-
fers. Joining a monetary union will change the demographics (common central
bank will take the whole population into account) and hence will lead to a sub-
optimal amount of transfers for both countries. Given this point, how close
the countries are in terms of their γs will play an important role determining
the benefits from forming a union. In the extreme case, where both countries
have the same exact γ, there will be no loss from surrendering a country’s
monetary tools to a common central bank.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied how changes in inflation associated with the
adoption of a common currency can alter the levels of consumption and earn-
ings inequalities. We showed that asymmetric demographic structures of coun-
tries combined with the adoption of a common currency affect these inequali-
ties in each country in a different way.
There is a monotonically negative relation between inflation and in-
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equality in our setting. Specifically, individuals are born with an unobserv-
able idiosyncratic shock17 and money is the only saving technology available.
Benevolent governments redistribute seignorage income. We proved that earn-
ings and consumption inequalities are decreasing functions of inflation. Intu-
ition behind this finding is that inflation, through its redistributive feature,
taxes income away from the rich. Suffering from high levels of taxation, the
rich has an incentive to decrease their output more than the poor 18. Total out-
put goes down and together with decreasing earnings inequality, consumption
inequality also falls as inflation rises.
Adoption of a common currency results in an inflation rate lower than
the one in the local currency case in at least one of the countries. We provide
conditions under which it falls for both countries. The main reason for the de-
crease is, with establishment of a monetary union, governments no longer need
to exhibit ”beggar thy neighbor” policies. Particularly, in the local currency
case, governments levy inflation tax on foreign individuals who have inelastic
portfolio decisions. Therefore, governments have an incentive to increase in-
flation rate more than the common currency rate of inflation. On the other
hand, the main reason for a possible increase of inflation in one country is
demographic asymmetry between countries (the country with an initially low
level of inflation will experience a rise in inflation in this case).
One important assumption in our analysis is the identical taste dis-
17That renders the fiscal tools not implementable because of unobservable types.
18This takes us back to Proposition 2.3.1.
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tributions across countries. Relaxing this assumption would lead to trade
imbalances and hence intercountry transfers of resources which might be an
important further study to pursue. Another interesting extension could be
including labor mobility as it would create non-trivial results on how income
distribution in both countries are going to be affected by migration.
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Chapter 3
Direct vs. Indirect Measures of Inflation
Expectations
3.1 Introduction
The ultimate goal of any central bank policy is to achieve and maintain
price stability. As an unobserved component, inflation expectations are very
crucial for determining future inflation, mainly through price and wage setting
behaviors. Therefore those expectations need to be measured with sufficient
precision. In this study we derive bounds for inflation expectations for the
US and Turkey using the relationship between interest rates and inflation
expectations, and compare these bounds to the results of survey data in these
two countries. Particularly, we recalculate inflation bounds in Ireland (1996b)
using one-year returns and compare these bounds with the direct measures
of inflation expectations, which are the median responses of the Livingston
survey. We apply the same procedure to Turkish data in an attempt to seek
a plausible indicator for Turkish inflation expectations1.
Our results show that, for US data, the inflation bounds suggested by
1As we will show later in the paper, restricting our attention to a developed country,
US, might lead to adverse conclusions and we believe Turkish economy is a good case for
developing countries.
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Ireland (1996b) are more volatile than survey results, and too narrow to con-
tain them, due to low standard errors in consumption growth series stemming
from high persistence. This result seems to be discouraging for the usefulness
of bounds, but the Turkish case offers better results in favor of this approach.
Calculated real interest rates are very volatile in Turkey and therefore move-
ments in the nominal interest rates themselves cannot be used as an indicator
of changes in inflation expectations. Taking risk premia into account, we derive
bounds on inflation expectations and they are in accordance with the results
of the Consumer Tendency Survey in Turkey.
No matter which type of monetary policy is preferred, discretion or a
rule, measuring agents’ expectations about inflation has been an important
part of the research held by economists in central banks. Under a discre-
tionary policymaker, the monetary policy is a game between the central bank
and individuals where the central bank optimizes its policy outcomes sub-
ject to the individual expectations 2. Hence, central banks need information
about individual expectations and should conduct research on measuring in-
flation expectations. On the other hand, under an implicitly followed or an
explicitly defined policy rule (e.g. inflation targeting), it is essential to obtain
information on individual expectations. The success of a full-fledged inflation
targeting regime relies on the credibility of the central bank and this credi-
bility is measured by forecast errors (see Johnson, 1998). As Mishkin (1999)
claims, inflation targeting is actually practiced very far from a rigid rule and
2See Barro and Gordon (1983) for the positive theory of monetary policy and inflation.
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requires that the central bank use all available information to determine the
appropriate policy actions to achieve its inflation target 3. King (1994) and
Bowen (1995) emphasize the importance of inflation expectations: under infla-
tion targeting, the inflation expectations are the intermediate goal and should
be explicitly targeted. Svensson (1997) shows that inflation targeting implies
inflation forecast targeting, and it is the best solution under the existing prob-
lems in implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the inflation targeting
regime. The problems stem from the significant control lag, which, as he men-
tions, 1.5 to 2 years. Since accountability and commitment mechanisms are
the main strengths of inflation targeting regimes, those problems reduce the
efficiency of the regime. Inflation forecast targeting solves this problem and
the central bank’s inflation forecast becomes an intermediate target. Neverthe-
less, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) find that direct targeting of private-sector
forecasts may lead to indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium.
Moreover, they also show that stabilization of the forecast has other undesir-
able properties. Still, they argue that private-sector forecasts and forecasts
inferred from financial markets should be part of the information gathered by
the central bank.
Signals about changes in inflation expectations through several vari-
ables and their importance in monetary policy have also been widely studied.
Goodfriend (1993) measures the Fed’s credibility by movements of inflation ex-
3In more recent research, Mishkin (2007) shows the direct implications of inflation ex-
pectations on inflation realizations and hence overall economic performance.
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pectations reflected in the long-term interest rate. According to Goodfriend,
for much of the 1979-1992 period the Fed’s policy actions were directed at
resisting inflation scares signaled by large sustained increases in the long-term
interest rate. Asset prices, on the other hand, are high frequency data and
carry an important amount of information about individual expectations in
an efficient market. Among others, Cecchetti et al. (2000) find strong support
for including stock prices directly in the central bank’s policy rule whereas
Bernanke and Gertler (2000, 2001) argue that monetary policy should not re-
spond to changes in asset prices except when they signal changes in inflation
expectations.
Literature on the relationship between future inflation and interest rates
starts with Fisher’s (1907) early work with a postulate that nominal interest
rates, in a perfect foresight world, are equal to the real rate of return plus
the future rate of inflation. A vast number of researchers have agreed on this
principle. However, the discussion about the composition of the two compo-
nents has been immense 4. Two views have been raised about the relationship
between the real rate and inflation expectations. The first view, following
Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965) claims that the expected real return com-
ponent of nominal interest rates is negatively related to the expected inflation
component. The intuition behind this view is that in an environment with high
inflation, agents economize on their nominal asset holdings and hold more real
balances which result in a lower marginal product of capital. The second view
4For a very detailed literature survey, see section 3 of Stock and Watson (2003).
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is contrary to the first one. This view started with Fama (1975), and advocates
the constancy of the real rate through time, and hence that nominal interest
rates can be used as a signal of future inflation expectations.
Using the short-term US Treasury Bills data, particularly regarding
one to six months treasuries, Fama (1975) found that the real interest rate
is fairly constant through time and expected inflation is responsible for the
variations in nominal interest rates. He used an autoregressive time series
model for the inflation rate and showed that the bond market is efficient, in
the sense that nominal interest rates contain all the information about future
inflation that is in the time-series of past inflation. Subsequent comments and
studies by Hess and Bicksler (1975), Joines (1977), Carlson (1977), Garbade
and Wachtel (1978), Fama (1976), Fama and Gibbons (1982) and Crowder
and Hoffman (1996) presented tests that rejected Fama’s hypothesis. Nelson
and Schwert (1977) asserted that Fama’s tests had very little power because
the lack of autocorrelation in ex-post real rates does not necessarily imply the
constancy of ex-ante real rates, especially if the variance of forecast errors is
high compared to the variance of the ex-ante real rate. More importantly,
they claimed that the market draws on information beyond the past inflation
rates. Therefore, an autoregressive time-series model might be misleading.
Using quarterly data, Mishkin (1981) tried to tackle this question with the
help of a large set of explanatory variables, particularly growth in monetary
aggregates and output as well as the unemployment rate, investment to capital
ratio and first order lags, in an ordinary least squares regression. His findings
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also rejected Fama’s (1975) hypothesis and he also found evidence for the
negative relationship between inflation expectations and the real interest rate,
reaffirming the Mundell-Tobin effect.
Discussion of the relation of inflation expectations to the ex-ante real
rate has extended even further after the uncertainty was introduced into the
Fisher equation by Lucas (1978). He suggested that, in a world with uncer-
tainty, nominal interest rates consist of a risk premium along with the real
rate of return and an inflation premium. Thus, variations in nominal inter-
est rates could be stemming from other sources than inflation expectations.
In particular, his model indicates that movements of nominal interest rates
will accurately signal changes in inflationary expectations if and only if real
interest rates are stable and risk premia are small. None of these three com-
ponents are observable, but Ireland (1996b) managed to characterize bounds
on inflation expectations using the risk premium. Using ten-year US Treasury
bond yields, he showed that real interest rates are quite stable. Therefore,
natural limits on risk premia 5 allowed him to draw the bounds on inflation
expectations, which are pretty close to each other for US data due to a low
risk premium. Ayuso and Salido (1998) applied his methodology to Spanish
data and compared the ex-ante real rates with the ex-post real rates. They
found that most of the difference between the ex-ante and ex-post real interest
rates come from agents’ expectation errors; i.e., bounds on expected inflation
driven from Lucas’s model are not wide enough to contain the inflation level.
5As will be explained later, there are natural limits on risk premia.
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Surveys on expectations about macroeconomic variables present direct
measures on individual expectations and have the main advantage that expec-
tations derived from survey results are undistorted by any auxiliary assump-
tions compared to the indirect measures summarized above (see, for example,
Berk (2000)). There are disadvantages to using surveys as well, as survey re-
sults are vulnerable to sampling errors and the specific questions asked might
affect the outcome significantly. More importantly, participants may not give
their decisions based on their responses in the survey (see Chan-Lee (1980)).
For further discussion about the properties of surveys of expectations, see
Roberts (1997).
In a recent study, Ang et al. (2007) found that surveys about indi-
vidual expectations forecast inflation significantly better than a wide range
of forecasting models which can be classified under three approaches: namely
time series ARIMA models, regressions using real activity measures motivated
from the Phillips curve, and regressions using term structures of interest rates.
They used three main surveys available for US data (the Livingston, Michi-
gan, and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) surveys) and found
that SPF performs slightly worse than the Livingston and Michigan surveys.
Moreover, they claimed that although there is theoretical support that com-
bining forecasts of many approaches (see Stock and Watson, 2002) outperforms
single forecasting models, combining their span of forecasts of inflation does
not generally lead to better out-of-sample forecasting performance empirically.
Our approach differs from theirs in the sense that we don’t analyze the perfor-
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mances of inflation forecasts but rather compare direct and indirect approaches
that yield inflation expectations.
Research on inflation expectations in Turkey is relatively new and
purely empirical. In one of the earlier works, Sahinbeyoglu and Yalcin (2000)
analyzed inflation expectations in Turkey by applying regressions with several
explanatory variables, following Mishkin (1981). They found that the term
structure of nominal interest rates has valuable information about inflation
expectations. However, their findings suggest a negative relationship between
the term structure of nominal interest rates and the future path of inflation,
contrary to relevant studies in the literature. They related this result to the
instability of the financial markets in Turkey.
Berument and Malatyali (2001) used a time series approach to ana-
lyze the relationship between interest rates and inflation in Turkey for the
1989-1998 period. They employed GARCH models to identify anticipated and
unanticipated inflation. Their findings support the existence of the Mundell-
Tobin effect for the case of Turkey, suggesting that the chronically high level
of inflation leads to low real rates and stimulates the Turkish economy 6. Our
study departs from theirs as well as from other relevant studies using Turk-
ish data in a couple of ways. First, we use a forward-looking model for the
inflation expectations while they assume purely adaptive expectations behav-
ior. Expectations should not be modeled by pure time-series models, because
6In a more recent paper, Gul and Acikalin (2008) rejected Fisher’s hypothesis for Turkish
data without using risk premia in the regression equation.
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individuals have a larger set of information than just the inflation series, and
they use this set fully in their decision-making processes. Therefore, similar
to Ireland (1996b), we use individual consumption decisions to derive infor-
mation about inflation expectations. Second, our approach doesn’t identify
inflation components; rather, it presents inflation bounds incorporated with
the inflation risk premium. Our main contribution to this literature is com-
paring the Turkish survey data with these bounds and testing the usefulness
of these survey results.
Literature using Turkish survey data on expectations is relatively lim-
ited, mainly due to the fact that a well established survey only dates back to
1987. The first survey on expectations in Turkey has been conducted on par-
ticipants from a pool of firm managers, and represents the expectations of only
one side of the economy. Two recent surveys on expectations aimed to fill this
gap. Research based on these surveys started with Karadas and Ogunc (2003)
where they tested and could not reject the rationality of inflation expectations
of the firm side. On the other hand, a set of regression analyses by Kara and
Kucuk-Tuger (2005) showed that formation of expectations, measured directly
through three expectations surveys available in Turkey, were highly biased and
inefficient 7. Their findings point to a significant correlation of expectation er-
rors with lagged effects of exchange rate movements suggesting a problem in
agents’ understanding of the exchange rate pass-through in Turkey. A more
7Barlas-Ozer and Mutluer (2005) also found evidence on systematic bias in inflation
expectations.
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recent study in 2009 by the same authors claimed a decrease in the degree of
this bias and inefficiency, and that the level of inflation in Turkey has become
relatively stable.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the
model we use to analyze the relationship between interest rates and inflation.
Section 3.3 explains the estimation methodology. The data used in this study
for the US case is presented in section 3.4 and the results are given in section
3.5. The Turkish data is explained in section 3.6 and the results are presented
in section 3.7. Finally, section 3.8 concludes the paper.
3.2 The Model
In this section, we introduce a version of the theoretical model originally
proposed by Lucas (1978). Our model economy is populated by a continuum
of infinitely lived households. The representative agent receives a stream of
income, yt. Each period, he chooses how much to consume ct and how much
to invest on two assets: one real asset bt that costs one unit of consumption
good at time t and returns rt consumption good at time t+1, and one nominal
asset Bt
8 costs Pt at time t and returns Rt at time t + 1 that can be traded
with consumption good at the price Pt+1.
There is uncertainty about future variables that will help us form the
bounds on inflation expectations following Ireland (1996b). The uncertainty is
8All nominal variables are represented in capital letters throughout the paper.
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about future prices, income, consumption, interest rates, and bond holdings.
That is, our representative agent may not learn the exact values of Pt, yt,
ct, Rt, rt, Bt, and bt until the beginning of period t; before then, he regards
these variables as random. As far as timing is concerned, representative agent
receives his period income and the returns on their assets invested previously,
observes period values of the variables listed above and allocates his period
resources in consumption and investment for future periods. The agent faces








subject to the following budget constraint:
ct + bt +Bt/Pt ≤ yt + rt−1bt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1/Pt (3.2)
Solution to this optimization problem yields the following two con-
ditions relating bond returns to expected inverse consumption growth and
expected inflation.
1/rt = βEt[(1/xt+1)] (3.3)
1/Rt = βEt[(1/xt+1)(1/πt+1)] (3.4)
where xt+1 = ct+1/ct and πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt are the rate of consumption and in-
flation, respectively. The first equation is relating the expected consumption
ratio to ex-ante real interest rate. The second equation presents this relation
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in terms of nominal variables, i.e. nominal interest rates and expected infla-
tion rate. Even though the ex-ante real interest rates are unobservable, this
equation lets us use consumption data as a way to obtain an estimate for them.
One can rewrite equation (3.4) as:
1/Rt = βCovt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)] + βEt[1/xt+1]Et[1/πt+1] (3.5)
combining with equation (3.3), we get:
1/Rt = βCovt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)] + (1/rt)Et[1/πt+1] (3.6)
Equation (3.6) is a generalized version of the well-known Fisher equa-
tion, which relates real interest rates to inflation and nominal interest rates.
This version of Fisher’s equation does that under the existence of risk stemmed
from uncertainty. Sign of the covariance term here determines how the nominal
interest rates are affected by the relation between inverse consumption growth
and inflation rate. This risk premium term accounts for the uncertainty about
future variables and will help us derive the bounds on inflation expectations.
To investigate this relationship further and derive the bounds, we follow by
replacing the risk premium term as:
βCovt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)] = βρtStdt[1/xt+1]Stdt[1/πt+1] (3.7)
where ρt is the correlation coefficient defined by:
ρt = Covt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)]/{Stdt[1/xt+1]Stdt[1/πt+1]} (3.8)
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Using the fact that the correlation coefficient has to be between −1 and
1, we derive the following inequality:
Stdt[1/xt+1]Stdt[1/πt+1] ≥ Covt[(1/xt+1), (1/πt+1)] ≥ −Stdt[1/xt+1]Stdt[1/πt+1]
(3.9)
This inequality puts bounds on the covariance term we are interested
in. Following Ireland (1996b), we impose the additional assumption on the
size of the coefficient of variation for 1/πt+1 :
Stdt[1/πt+1]/Et[1/πt+1] ≤ 1 (3.10)
As Ireland (1996b) has done it for US case, we justified this assumption
by looking at the Turkish data as well and found that the coefficient of variation
never exceeded 0.05 for 1998-2008 period. Hence, similar to Ireland (1996b),
our bounds are extremely conservative.
In the light of equation (3.10), rearranging equation (3.9) using (3.5)
gives us:
βRt{Et[1/xt+1] + Stdt[1/xt+1]} ≥ 1/E[1/πt+1]
≥ βRt{Et[1/xt+1]− Stdt[1/xt+1]}
(3.11)
This is almost exactly what one needs to derive the bounds on expected
inflation. If we use the approximation:
1/Et[1/πt+1] ≈ Et[πt+1] (3.12)
then we have the bounds ready to be estimated. The width of the bounds will
be dependent on the size of the risk premium, which in term will be estimated
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using the consumption ratio using aggregate consumption data. Now we move
on the next section for details on how we estimate these bounds.
3.3 Estimation Methodology for the Real Interest Rate
and Bounds on Expected Inflation
We use the same estimation technique proposed by Ireland (1996b).
The relationship between observed variables, nominal interest rate and con-
sumption, and unobserved variables, real interest rate and bounds on expected
inflation, are proposed by equations (3.3) and (3.11). The only two unknowns
in these equations are Et[1/xt+1] and Stdt[1/xt+1], namely expectation and
standard deviation of next period’s inverse growth rate of aggregate consump-
tion, and can be estimated through a time series model fit to 1/xt+1. Now, for
convenience, let gt+1 = 1/xt+1 and assume that gt+1 follows an AR(1) process
such that
gt+1 = γ + ρgt + εt+1 (3.13)
where γ is a constant and ρ is the AR(1) parameter. εt+1 is the random error
term and satisfies
Et[εt+1] = 0, Stdt[εt+1] = σ,Et[εt+1εt−j] = 0, Et[εt+1gt−j] = 0 ∀j (3.14)
where σ is constant through time. Next, we define the data we use for US.
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3.4 US Data
Our model period is one quarter, similar to Ireland (1996b), but we
use annual bond yields instead of ten-year returns, i.e. 4-period-ahead expec-
tations are used. Since the model period is finer than the interval of bond
yields, estimation using ordinary least squares give consistent estimates of AR
parameters but biased σ estimates (see Hansen and Hodrick (1980) 9). Con-
sistent estimates of σ are derived using the method proposed in Hansen and
Hodrick (1980), modified as suggested by Newey and West (1987).
We analyzed 1959:1 to 2009:1 period for US data. The nominal inter-
est rate is measured by the market yield on U.S. Treasury bonds at 1-year
constant maturity achieved from the Federal Reserve database. Per capita
consumption values are found by dividing the seasonally adjusted series of
real personal aggregate nondurables and services expenditures 10 by the size
of the noninstitutional civilian population, ages 16 and over 11.
3.4.1 Livingston Survey
As discussed in Croushore (1997), the Livingston survey is the oldest
survey on expectations. Survey participants are selected mainly from firm
9Hansen and Hodrick (1980) further show that k -step-ahead OLS estimator is dominant
to the OLS estimator proposed by the resampling at every kth integer in the sense that
(1) the latter exceeds in error variance over the former by a positive definite matrix, and
(2) using the former has a higher power in testing the null hypothesis. Therefore, the
estimation strategy used in our paper is superior to the natural alternative of adjusting the
model period to one year.
10Consumption Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
11Population Data Source: Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey.
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managers, investment and commercial bankers, professors and professionals
from labor organizations, government and insurance companies. Twice each
year, they are asked about their forecasts of a wide variety of macroeconomic
variables with a forecast time span ranging from current month to 10 years.
We calculated percentage difference between median responses of forecasts for
the consumer price index (CPI) level 12 months after the survey date and that
for current survey date 12.
3.5 Results for US Data
Results for US data is depicted in Figure 3.1. Bounds for inflation
expectations are far wider in our model based on one-year returns compared
to ten-year returns of Ireland’s, bound width is between 1.32% and 1.52% in
our model while it is 0.15% to 0.17% in Ireland’s. However, they are still too
narrow to contain survey results. Particularly, bounds do not contain survey
results 53% of the time. The Livingston survey results offer a much smoother
path for the inflation expectations than the expectations derived from our
model. The main reason behind this result is the excess volatility in nomi-
nal interest rates compared to inverse growth in consumption. With a lower
variability in the real rate suggested by the observed stable path of inverse
consumption growth, inflation expectations capture most of the variability in
nominal rates.
12Livingston Data Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Figure 3.1: Inflation Expectations in US: Direct vs Indirect Measures
We now turn our attention to Turkish data where there is higher vari-
ability in real rates and risk premia as it will be shown later below.
3.6 Turkish Data
This section analyzes 2000-2009 period for Turkish data. There are rea-
sons for this choice. First, Turkey experienced a disinflation and stabilization
process starting from 2000 and a more stable state has been reached by the
end of 2003. These two different environments offer a good analysis diversity.
Second, and more importantly, data availability on surveys limits our set of
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possible dates. Only one of the surveys was available before 2001 while the
other two surveys we analyzed have starting dates of 2001 and 2003.
Data is gathered as follows. The nominal interest rates are yearly com-
pounded interest rates of treasury discounted auctions 13, available monthly
for our sample period. There have been three months where the Turkish Trea-
sury did not auction bills but since no two or more such instances occurred
in a certain quarter, we just ignored those dates when we get quarterly aver-
ages. Consumption data is obtained by dividing seasonally adjusted private
final consumption expenditure figures 14 by the estimated quarterly popula-
tion, ages between 15 and 64. Mid-year population estimates and population
growth rates are combined with age dependency ratio 15 and interpolated to
achieve quarterly population figures.
3.6.1 Consumer Tendency Survey
Starting from 2003, TURKSTAT and CBRT have jointly conducted
the Consumer Tendency Survey (CTS), which aims at measuring consumer
tendencies and expectations for general economic course, job opportunities,
personal financial standing and market developments in order to assess their
expenditure behavior as well as their expectations. The scope of the survey
includes all individuals who are 15 and above and have a job that provide
13Nominal Interest Rates Source: Turkish Undersecretariat of Treasury.
14Consumption Data Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts Dataset, LNBQRSA
measure.
15Population Data Source: TURKSTAT.
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income, in urban or rural areas of Turkey. Survey frequency is one month
and the participant size changes between 7100 and 8700 for the 2003-2009
period. Inflation expectations are asked as the direction of changes in prices
over the next 12 months and hence point estimates of inflation expectations
are unavailable and need to be derived. A recent study by Oral (2009) that
quantifies answers about inflation expectations of this survey is used for this
purpose.
3.6.2 Survey of Expectations
The Survey of Expectations (SoE) has been conducted by CBRT in
order to closely monitor the expectations of experts, professionals and decision
makers from the financial and real sectors. The survey aims to provide direct
measures for expectations of consumer price inflation, interest rates, exchange
rate, current account balance and gross national product growth rate. It is
conducted twice a month, in the first and third weeks of every month. A non-
probabilistic sampling method based on participation of selected volunteers is
used due to the small sample size of the survey. Size of the participation varies
between 42 and 102 for the 2001-2009 period. Point estimates for the relevant
variables are asked to survey participants. The appropriate mean is calculated
by using mean, median, mode, alpha-trimmed mean and outlier analysis by
the CBRT and is the main measure used in this paper.
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3.6.3 Business Tendency Survey
CBRT has been carrying out the Business Tendency Survey (BTS)
since December 1987. BTS is a monthly survey and produce indicators that
reflect the short-term tendencies in the manufacturing industry. The survey
compiles the assessments of the senior managers on the recent past, current and
expected future course of business environment. Since the survey participants
are from the production side of the economy, producer prices inflation is asked
instead of consumer prices inflation. Therefore, results derived from this survey
is only for comparison purposes.
3.7 Results for Turkish Data
We first derive ex-ante real interest rates from our model and compare
them with the ex-post real rates calculated using nominal returns and actual
inflation. Figure 3.2 depicts both series 16. It can be seen as a data fact that
ex-post real rates are highly volatile. Even though the induced ex-ante real
rates are less volatile than the ex-post rates, they vary within a range of -6.9%
to 17.6%, which makes it impossible to infer inflation expectations movements
directly from a change in nominal interest rates. Therefore, deriving bounds
for Turkish inflation expectations is more important and essential compared
to US case.
The bounds for inflation expectations are derived for Turkish data and
16Note that we covered 1998-2009 period in the figure while our time period for comparison
purposes is 2000-2009.
71
Figure 3.2: Ex-ante and Ex-post Real Rates in Turkey
compared with the three different expectations surveys mentioned above. Our
model is expected to capture the inflation expectations of a representative con-
sumer, therefore one can expect bounds computed from our model to contain
survey results from CTS better than the other two surveys. Hence, we first
analyze the Consumer Tendency Survey in Figure 3.3. Actual inflation series
is also drawn for comparison purposes. Because of the late availability of the
survey, we can make a comparison only for the stable inflation path starting
from late 2003. For this same reason, an analysis of the disinflation process
in Turkey, during 2000-2003, is not possible with this particular survey data.
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Our results show that the CTS responses are contained within the bounds for
the whole sample period.
Figure 3.3: Inflation Expectations in TR: CTS vs Model
The survey results of SoE is one of the main indicators of the economy
followed closely by CBRT. We can observe in Figure 3.4 that survey results
could not be contained well by our bounds most of the time. The failure rate
is 52% for the full sample period and 32% for the 2003-2008 period.
Although the participants of the BTS are only firm managers and they
are asked about whole sale price inflation rather than inflation in CPI, we
present its results in Figure 3.5 for comparison purposes. Our bounds seem to
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Figure 3.4: Inflation Expectations in TR: SoE vs Model
capture the levels and movements in inflation expectations measured by BTS
much better than those by SoE, with a failure rate of 30% for the full sample
period.
We can observe a systematic bias in inflation expectations measured
by both approaches in the sense that expected inflation is higher than actual
inflation for most of the time, especially during disinflation process. This re-
sult complies with the previous literature. In particular, Johnson (2002) listed
the relevant literature suggesting that in the early years of inflation targets,
expected inflation exceeds actual inflation, and in observing unexpected disin-
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Figure 3.5: Inflation Expectations in TR: BTS vs Model
flation, infer that inflation targets did not shift expected inflation very much.
3.8 Conclusion
Measuring inflation expectations is one of the main goals for central
banks. There are direct and indirect measures available to central banks and
many different techniques have been proposed in the literature. In this study,
we tested the bounds of inflation expectations obtained from Ireland (1996b),
an indirect measure, using multiple survey results, a direct measure, in two
countries, US and Turkey. Our results indicate that, those bounds do a bet-
75
ter job containing the survey results in Turkey compared to US. The main
reason behind this fact is the sensitivity of the Ireland’s methodology to the
movements in consumption growth rates. As the estimate for the ex-ante in-
terest rates are calculated using the consumption growth rates in our model,
and Turkish consumption data is a lot more volatile than its US counterpart,
inflation expectations bounds for Turkey are a lot wider than they are for US
case.
A secondary result obtained from our analysis is that, unlike in US,
real interest rates are extremely volatile in Turkey and movements in nominal
interest rates can not be used to predict the changes in inflation expectations.
Due to a stable real interest rate and low risk premia in US, Ireland (1996b)
suggests that movements in the nominal interest rates primarily reflect changes
in inflationary expectations. However, Turkish case offers unstable real rates
and high risk premia, and therefore computing a good measure of inflation
expectations is more essential.
Evidently, out of 4 surveys we compared, CTS fell within the bounds for
the whole sample period which implies a zero failure rate. However, Livingston
survey, SoE and BTS have 53%, 52% and 30%, recpectively. These failure rates
are significantly higher than CTS’ failure rate. This result is not so surprising
as Ireland (1996b)’s model fits the problem of an ordinary consumer the best,
not a producer’s. That’s why one should expect the CTS results to be most
comparable to Ireland (1996b)’s bounds. For this reason, a good indirect
measure should account for consumers and producers at the same time. That
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might be one aspect Ireland (1996b)’s bounds is missing.
This study is the first attempt to compare direct and indirect measures
of inflation expectations. The purpose of this study is not to improve the
predictive power of Ireland (1996b)’s bounds on inflation expectations but
compare them with the available direct measures. A natural extension would
be to improve the model to account for producer’s side so that the bounds fit
other surveys as well. One direction for further research is modifying the model
in a way that it can be used for parameter estimation in a cross-country setting
(e.g. risk aversion, tightness of borrowing constraints, etc.). This field is very
open to further research and policy makers in developing countries especially,













Multiplying both sides with γ and (1 − γ) for good and bad types,
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(1.2) suggests that individuals allocate their portfolio share propor-
tional to their expected taste shocks. Solving for φ, we reach the proposed
relationship between φ, Z and σ.
Steady state employment levels can be found as follows. First, we use
the portfolio decision (1.1) to get home currency holding of home agents:
mh,it = θ(α
initpt + τt+1)− τt+1
Then, substituting this into (2.4) together with (2.2), we obtain steady
state employment levels from two equations-two unknowns presented as the
second of the steady state conditions in the proposition.



















Combining money market clearing conditions for home and foreign
countries as well as exchange rate markets yield the following money stock
relation between countries:
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(1− φ)Mt = et(1− φ∗)M∗t (1.4)

























This equation and its counterpart for the bad type agents together with
(1.2) yield the consumption levels.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.2. Substituting (2.11) and (2.12) into government’s






























As we will prove in proposition 2.3.2, difference of inverse consumption
shares in the parenthesis on the left hand side and dκ(σ)
dσ
are both negative.
Hence, left hand side is always positive. Therefore, at optimum, right hand
side of the equality should be positive as well. Now we will show that for any
σ ≤ Z, right hand side cannot be positive. Firstly, we proved in proposition






are negative. It remains to show that, for σ ≤ Z,
(g′(ng)/αg−θ/Y ) and (g′(nb)/αb−θ/Y ) are both positive which will imply that







, therefore it is sufficient to show that (g′(ng)/αg −





plugging in from 1.10 and using the definition of Y and organize the terms,
we get:
αgng(1 + γ(σ − 1/θ)) + αbnb((1− γ)(σ − 1/θ)) ≥ 0
which is a contradiction since both terms on the left hand side are negative
for σ ≤ Z, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. For σ = 0, employment levels satisfying (2.9) and
(2.10) also satisfy ng(0)g′(ng(0)) = nb(0)g′(nb(0)) = 1. Therefore ng(0) =
nb(0) is satisfied and due to convexity of disutility function, the solution is
unique.
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(2.9) and (2.10), ngg′(ng) > nbg′(nb). Contradiction.
Now we prove the second part of the proposition. Equating (1.10) and
(1.11) implies αg(ng − 1
g′(ng)
) = αb(nb− 1
g′(nb)
). Differentiating both sides w.r.t


















This suggests that responses of employment to inflation have the same
signs for good and bad types. Moreover, using convexity of g1 and ng ≥ nb,






















g′′(ng) + (g′(ng))2(1 + σγ)
(1.9)
1Note that integration on convex functions is a convex operation, which means that g is
a convex transformation of g′, and g′ is a convex transformation of g′′; then one can show
that g′/g′′ is an increasing function.
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can’t be both positive, suggesting that both are
negative. That is, as inflation rises, real return to work decreases and hence,
all the individuals in the economy work less.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. By working on right hand sides of (2.9) and (2.10),
these two equations can be simplified as:
αg
g′(ng)
= αgng + σY (1.10)
αb
g′(nb)
= αbnb + σY (1.11)







Using (2.4), we have ch,gt+1 > c
h,b













Substituting this into (2.11) completes the first part of the proof. For
the second part, see the proof of Proposition 2.2.2.
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We will later prove in proposition 2.3.4 that RHS gets bigger as inflation
increases. So, LHS should also increase. Together with the convexity of disu-
tility, we complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.4. To prove that earnings inequality is decreasing in
σ, we simply use (1.8). Next we show that the proof for consumption inequality











(αgng − αbnb) (1.14)
As seen easily, the term in the parenthesis is earnings inequality and the
coefficient term is also decreasing in σ. Therefore, consumption inequality for
home goods is decreasing in σ. This suggests that ch,g/ch,b is also a decreasing
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function of σ and we know from the definition in (2.11) that ch,g/ch,b = cf,g/cf,b.
So, the same result applies to foreign goods inequality as well.

















For any given consumption weights µ, we know that both terms in the
right hand side of (1.15) are decreasing in σ, and so is any convex combination
of them. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1. First, we need to show that qhY = qfY ∗. To show
that we will use the market clearing condition for home goods:
θ(γIgt+1 + (1− γ)Ibt+1) + (1− θ)(γ∗I
∗g
t+1 + (1− γ∗)I∗bt+1) = qht+1Y (1.16)




t+1 ≡ I it+1 in on the left hand side. Reorganizing
the equation, we obtain: τ cc = Y qht+1− θY qht − (1− θ)Y ∗q
f
t and we repeat the






t + (1− 2θ)
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t and plugging this in, we obtain
qhY = qfY ∗. Now, the rest of the proof is as follows: we take (2.16) and put I
in from the budget constraint and using qhY = qfY ∗ we obtain the equations
(2.17)-(2.20), and the uniqueness follow from the convexity of g(n).
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2. First, we define the components of the value func-
tions as follows. Let










h2(σ) = ln(1 + σ)
h3(θ) = Eθ[θlnθ + (1− θ)ln(1− θ)]
h4(θ) = θlnθ + (1− θ)ln(1− θ)
Then, we can write
V cc(σcc) = h1(γ, σ
cc) + h1(γ
∗, σcc)− 2h2(σcc) + 2h3(θ)
V LC(γ, σLC) = h1(γ, σ
LC)− h2(σLC) + h4(θ) + (1− θ)ln
Y ∗κ∗
Y κ
V ∗LC(γ∗, σ∗LC) = h1(γ
∗, σ∗LC)− h2(σ∗LC) + h4(θ)− (1− θ)ln
Y ∗κ∗
Y κ













+ (1− θ)dY κ
dσ
|σ=σ∗LC (1.19)



























Therefore, since σcc is the optimum, we have σ∗LC > σcc. That is,
σcc cannot be greater than the higher of the two local currency equilibrium
inflation rates.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3. First, we start by showing that ∆E.I. is decreasing
in σcc. Note that since equations (2.17)-(2.20) are the exact counterparts for
equations (2.9) and (2.10), their responses to inflation is going to be the same.
So, ∆E.I. is decreasing in σ
cc following the proof of proposition 2.3.4.
Next, we show that the proof for consumption inequality follows from






(αgng − αbnb) (1.24)
The rest of the proof follows from the proof of proposition 2.3.4.
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Dı́az-Giménez, J., Quadrini, V., Rı́os-Rull, J. V. 1997. Dimensions of Inequal-
ity: Facts on the U.S. Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth. Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 21 (2), 3-21.
Doepke, M., Schneider, M., 2006. Inflation as a Redistribution Shock: Effects
on Aggregates and Welfare. NBER Working Papers 12319.
Doepke, M., Schneider, M., 2006. Inflation and the Redistribution of Nominal
Wealth. Journal of Political Economy 114 (6), 1069-1097.
Easterly, W., Fischer, S., 2001. Inflation and the Poor. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, Part 1, 159-178.
Erosa,A., Ventura, G., 2002. On Inflation as a Regressive Consumption Tax.
Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 761-795.
Fama, E. F., 1975. Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation. Amer-
ican Economic Review 65 (3), 269-282.
Fama, E. F., 1976. Inflation Uncertainty and Expected Returns on Treasury
Bills. Journal of Political Economy 84 (3), 427-448.
Fama, E. F., Gibbons, M. R., 1982. Inflation, Real Returns and Capital In-
vestment. Journal of Monetary Economics 9, 297-323.
Fisher, I., 1907. The Rate of Interest. New York: MacMillan Company.
Friedman, M., 1969. The Optimum Quantity of Money, In: The Optimum
Quantity of Money and Other Essays (Aldine, Chicago, IL) 1-50.
93
Garbade, K., Wachtel, P., 1978. Time Variation in the Relationship Between
Inflation and Interest Rates. Journal of Monetary Economics 4, 755-765.
Goodfriend, M., 1993. Interest Rate Policy and the Inflation Scare Problem:
19791992. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 79 (1),
1-24.
Greenwood, J., Hercowitz, Z., Huffman, G., 1988. Investment, Capacity Uti-
lization and the Real Business Cycle. American Economic Review 78, 402-
417.
Gul, E., Acikalin, S., 2008. An Examination of the Fisher Hypothesis: The
Case of Turkey. Applied Economics 40 (24), 3227-3231.
Hansen, L. P., Hodrick, R. J., 1980. Forward Exchange Rates as Optimal
Predictors of Future Spot Rates: An Econometric Analysis. The Journal of
Political Economy 88 (5), 829-853.
Hess, P. J., Bicksler, J. L., 1975. Capital Asset Prices versus Time Series
Models as Predictors of Inflation: The Expected Real Rate of Interest and
Market Efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics 2, 341-360.
Imrohoroglu, A., 1992. The Welfare Cost of Inflation Under Imperfect Insur-
ance. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 16, 79-91.
Ireland, P., 1996. The Role of Countercyclical Monetary Policy. Journal of
Political Economy 104 (4), 704-723.
94
Ireland, P. N., 1996. Long-Term Interest Rates and Inflation: A Fisherian
Approach. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 82 (1),
21-35.
Joines, D., 1977. Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation: Com-
ment. American Economic Review 67 (3), 476-477.
Johnson, D. R., 1998. The Credibility of Monetary Policy: International Evi-
dence Based on Surveys of Expected Inflation. In: Macklem, T. (Ed.), Price
Stability, Inflation Targets and Monetary Policy. Proceedings of a Confer-
ence held by the Bank of Canada, May 1997. Bank of Canada, Ottawa,
361-395.
Johnson, D. R., 2002. The Effect of Inflation Targeting on the Behavior of Ex-
pected Inflation: Evidence from an 11 Country Panel. Journal of Monetary
Economics 49, 1521-1538.
Kara, H., Kucuk-Tuger, H., 2005. Some Evidence on the (Ir)rationality of
Inflation Expectations in Turkey. Central Bank of Turkey Research and
Monetary Policy Department Working Paper No: 05/12.
Kara, H., Kucuk-Tuger, H., 2009. Inflation Expectations in Turkey: Learning
to be Rational. Applied Economics, forthcoming.
Karadas, E., Ogunc, F., 2003. An Analysis of Inflation Expectations of the
Turkish Private Manufacturing Industry. Central Bank Review 3 (2), 57-83.
95
Kimbrough, K. P., 1986. The Optimum Quantity of Money Rule in the Theory
of Public Finance. Journal of Monetary Economics 18, 277-284.
King, M. 1994. Monetary Policy in the UK. Fiscal Studies 15 (3), 109-128.
Krusell, P., Rı́os-Rull, J. V. 1999. On the Size of U.S. Government: Politi-
cal Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model. The American Economic
Review 89 (5), 1156-1181.
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